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EMPLOYEE INTERROGATION AS "INHERENTLY
DESTRUCTIVE" CONDUCT: A NEW APPROACH
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act grants to those employees under its regulation the substantive right of self-organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other forms of mutual aid or protection.1 To protect these rights, the National Labor Relations Board
[the Board] has established a system of ground rules to govern the preelection conduct of employers. 2 One small segment of this regulation is
directed at an employer's interrogation of his employees. The need to
control this form of employer conduct will be more clearly understood
after an examination of its characteristics and legal significance.
Generally speaking, employee interrogation involves the employer's
efforts to elicit from his employees information about the status of union
organizational activities.8 In most cases the employer questions the employee about his personal inclinations toward or his affiliations with
unionization. 4 However, in some instances an employee may also be
questioned about the union sentiments or activities of his fellow employees.5 The scope of an interrogation naturally varies in each case. It
may range from a short mild inquiry as to the nature and scope of an
unidentified disruptive force among the employees to an extensive formal
polling of their desire for union representation. 6 An interrogation may be
conducted for legitimate informative purposes or to intimidate and coerce
the employees in their organizational activities. It may be directed to
1. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides in part that:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities....

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).

2. For an exhaustive analysis of NLRB regulation of pre-election conduct, see
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rzv. 38 (1964).
3. See, e.g., In re Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
See also 15 NLRB ANN. R m. 93 (1950).
4. E.g., NLRB v. Borden Co., 328 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Elias
Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 325 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109
N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
5. E.g., Cohen Bros. Fruit Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 65 L.R.R.M. 1486 (June 28,
1967); Standard Electric Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 64 L.R.R.M. 1128 (Jan. 23,
1967); Abex Corp. Engineered Products Division, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 64
L.R.R.M. 1004 (Dec. 22, 1966).
6. E.g., Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (June
26, 1967); Anderson Air Activities, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 698 (1960). There is a
definitional distinction between the questioning and the polling of an employee which
should be recognized. Questioning is inquisitive in nature while polling calls for the
employee to take an affirmative stand for or against the union. Blue Flash Express,
Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 596-97 (1954) (dissenting opinion). Both of these are forms
of employee interrogation. This distinction is somewhat fine but it is warranted in
light of the fact that the Board and the courts have freely interchanged them in the
formulation of their doctrinal approaches to this problem.
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employees that are relatively inactive in the union's organizational campaign and who are friendly toward the employer or it may be directed to
7
active campaign leaders who are essentially antagonistic.
The basic reason for the regulation of this form of pre-election conduct is that fundamental employer and employee interests come into
conflict, thus creating a disruptive effect upon the natural evolution of
employee unionization.8 On the one hand there exists those genuine employer interests in obtaining information about the nature and extent of
the organization of his employees. These interests may be legal, business,
personal or strategic in nature. On the other hand there exists the employee's interest in the unrestrained exercise of his right to self-organization for the purpose of participating in an industrial form of government.
This interest is basically a manifestation of economic, social, and industrialpolitical interests which are more fundamental in nature. Necessarily,
when these antagonistic interests come into conflict, injury to some of
them will result. To the extent that this injury is inconsistent with the
policy of the National Labor Relations Act to provide the employee with
a free chance as to whether he desires to be represented by a union in a
collective bargaining process with his employer, employee interrogation
must be regulated. The nature and form which this regulation should
take is the focal point of this Comment.
The legal significance of employee interrogation pivots around three
unfair labor practice provisions of the Act - sections 8 (a) (1),9 8 (a) (3)10
and 8(a) (5). 11 Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise
of their section 7 rights.' 2 This section relates directly to the problem
of employee interrogation because the ultimate determination made by the
Board is whether the interrogation did interfere with, restrain, or coerce
the employees. Section 8(a) (3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment.' 8 Its relevance to employee interrogation is in the causal connection between the information obtained during the interrogation and
subsequent discrimination against the interrogatee. In many cases the
7. See, e.g., Continental Can Co., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 640 (1964) ; North Country
Motors, Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479 (1961).
8. See Bok, supra note 2, at 106, 112.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).

11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).

12. Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section [7]

29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).

13. Section 8(a) (3) provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
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Board has used a section 8(a) (3) violation to justify a finding that
employee interrogation was in fact coercive. 14 Section 8(a) (5) makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees. 15 This section is relevant to the
problem of employee interrogation since the employer often raises the
duty to bargain as a justification for polling his employees. 16 His argument usually states that the interrogation was necessary to determine
whether the union demanding recognition actually was the authorized
collective bargaining representative of an appropriate bargaining unit. The
merits of this argument will be discussed at a later point, but it is sufficient
for now to recognize that it is pertinent.
Another provision of the Act which often appears in discussions of
employee interrogation is section 8(c). 1 7 This section, popularly referred
to as the "employers free speech" provision, provides that an employer
may express his views, arguments, or opinions concerning unionization
and it will not constitute an unfair labor practice provided that these
8
expressions contain no threats of reprisal, force or promise of benefit.'
This section is often relied upon by employers as a defense to charges
that their interrogation of employees constituted a section 8(a) (1) violation. 1 However, this argument is misplaced. Section 8(c) is not really
relevant to the issue of the legality of an employee interrogation, since
interrogation is an effort by the employer to elicit information from the
employee, and not an expression of his views, arguments or opinions.
The basic purpose of this Comment is to analyze those approaches
taken by the Board and the courts to the problem of employee interrogation, and to suggest a new approach based on an evaluation of the attendant conflicting employer-employee interests and their need for legal
recognition. Part II will consider first the various approaches taken by
the Board in determining whether an employee interrogation is violative
of section 8(a) (1) and then the subsequent courts of appeals discontent
14. 15 NLRB ANN. Rgp. 95 (1950).
15. Section 8(a) (5) states in part that "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer - (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees.
... 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
16. For an example of this employer argument, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 609 (1969).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
18. Section 8 (c) states that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force of promise
of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
19. Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB
v. Jackson Press, Inc., 201 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B.
1358 (1949) ; Ames Spot Welder Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 352 (1947). A similar defense
sometimes raised by employers is that prohibition of employee interrogation is a violation of their first amendment rights. This argument has received limited acceptance
to the extent of protecting random inquiries. See Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th
Cir. 1948) ; Jacksonville Paper Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1943).
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with each approach. Part III will evaluate the strength of each of those
interests that come into conflict because of the interrogation and balance
these interests to determine which should receive legal recognition. Part
IV will then suggest a new approach that could be taken to this problem.
This suggestion will be based upon the balancing test applied in Part
III and will incorporate the present Board approach enunciated in the
Struksnes Constr. Co. case.
II.

BOARD

DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS -

A

STRUGGLE

FOR STANDARDS

Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act the Board
has experienced a doctrinal evolution marked by three distinct approaches
to the problem of employer interrogation. The first approach is recognized as the Standard-Coosa-ThatcherCo., 20 doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Board considered employee interrogation to be unlawful per se,
2
notwithstanding a narrow exception for isolated and sporadic questioning. 1
22
The second approach, outlined in Blue Flash Express, Inc., encompassed
a broad flexible rule which considered the surrounding circumstances of
the interrogation to be the determinative factor of coercive effects upon
the employees.2 3 The third and present Board approach was enunciated
in Struksnes Constr. Co. 24 It provides that in the absence of unusual
circumstances an employer's poll of his employees will constitute an
8(a)(1) violation unless five specific safeguards are strictly observed.
These safeguards are designed to eliminate the coercive effects of polling
upon employees. Although this approach seems limited to polling, an
argument can be made that it was intended to apply to other forms of
25
interrogation as well.

Notwithstanding the Struksnes rule because of its youth, the Board's
doctrinal approaches have encountered various degrees of judicial discontent among the circuits. As a result, separate bodies of judicial criteria
have emerged, generally for the purpose of examining all the variable
factors in each case in an effort to make a more accurate determination
of the actual coercive effect of an interrogation upon the employee's free
exercise of their section 7 rights.2 6 The inconsistency of this judicial
20. 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
21. Id. at 1360-61. See also 20 NLRB

ANN. Rlp. 67 (1955).
22. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
23. Id. at 593.
24. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (June 26, 1967).
25. 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (June 26, 1967). The argument is found in the
language of Struksnes. The Board said:
In our view any attempt by an employer to ascertain employee views and
sympathies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the
mind of the employee if he replies in favor in unionism and, therefore, tends to
impinge on his Section 7 rights. . . . That such employee fear is not without
foundation is demonstrated by the innumerable cases in which the prelude to
discrimination was the employer's inquiries as to the union sympathies of his
employees.
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Camco, Inc., 340 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
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response, coupled with the Board's efforts to adjust its doctrine to these
criteria, has resulted in a labyrinth of varying standards. An examination
of each of these doctrinal approaches and the subsequent judicial response
to them will provide a good reference point from which to begin the
search for a new approach.
A.

The STANDARD-COOsA-THATCHER Doctrine

Prior to its decision in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., the Board
took a rather restrictive approach toward employee interrogation and
27
consequently, in most cases it was found to be an 8(a) (1) violation.
This approach was objective in nature in that the employer's intent to
coerce the employees was not determinative. 28 Rather, the test was
whether the conduct was reasonably calculated or tended to interfere with
29
the employees free exercise of their section 7 rights.
In Standard, the Board established an almost absolute prohibition
of employee interrogation. After rejecting the respondent's argument that
interrogation is protected by section 8(c), it held that interrogation of
employees as to union matters was per se a violation of 8(a) (1).30 The
Board concluded that:
[W]e believe that interrogation of employees as to union matters
constitutes, at the very least, interference with the rights protected
by Section 7. Whenever an employer directly or indirectly attempts
to secure information concerning the manner in which or the extent
to which his employees have chosen to engage in union organization
or other concerted activities, he invades an area guaranteed
to be
1
exclusively the business and concern of his employees.3
The underlying rationale for this strict doctrine appears to be the
Board's fear that the danger to employee rights of self-organization is
inherent in the interrogation itself and not just a factor of the surrounding circumstances. This is supported by its reference to the employees'
right to privacy in their union affairs and the fact that the very nature
of an interrogation is to invade this privacy.3 2 Further support is found
1964); NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1963); S.H.
Kress & Co. v. NLRB, 317 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Firedoor Corp. of
America, 291 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th
Cir. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Hagy, Harrington & Marsh, 74 N.L.R.B. 1455 (1947); Newman
Mach. Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 220 (1947); Sewell Mfg. Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 85 (1947),
enforced as modified, 172 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,
25 N.L.R.B. 193 (1940), enforced as modified, 122 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 804 (1941).
28. 15 NLRB ANN. Rxp. 96 (1950).
29. Id.
30. 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1362 (1949). The Board did not use the word per se,
but its strong prohibitory language is equivalent in meaning. Furthermore, the Board
has referred to its decision in Standard as a per se rule. See, Struksnes Constr. Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (June 26, 1967).
31. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1949) (emphasis
added).
2. Id. at 1360-61.
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in the Board's reference to the subtle but effective psychological restraints
experienced by the interrogatee and the subsequent practices of discrimi88
nation that result from the information obtained.
If, after the Standard rule was announced, there was any doubt as
to the Board's prohibitive policy toward employee interrogation, it was
removed in the Katz Drug Co.34 case. In this case, Local #688 of the
Warehouse and Distribution Workers union was engaged in recognitional
picketing at several of the employer's Missouri stores.8 5 The employer
filed suit in Missouri state court seeking an injunction pursuant to a state
statute which made picketing by a non-majority union unlawful.8 6 In
perparation for the injunction hearing and to meet his burden of proof
on the issue of whether the union did in fact represent a majority, the
employer asked his employees to read and sign, if they wished, an affidavit
which stated that they were not members of the organizing union. 7 The
union filed charges with the Regional Director who subsequently issued
a complaint alleging that respondent had unlawfully interrogated his
employees in violation of 8(a) (1).88 The trial examiner found no violation, but the Board reversed, holding that the employer had committed
an 8(a) (1) unfair labor practice because the interrogation of his employees was a per se interference with and coercion of the employees in
the free exercise of their section 7 rights.8 9 In a footnote to their opinion,
the Board pointed up the scope of this doctrine:
[Our] concern in interdicting interrogation is with the coercive effect
which such conduct has upon employees, and with the manner in
which interrogation injects the employer into an area guaranteed by
the Act as the exclusive concern of employees. As such, neither the
lack of an unlawful intent nor the absence of threats or promises is
material. That is precisely what [we have] meant when
40 [we have]
so often characterized interrogation as unlawful per se.
The Board had previously created a narrow exception to this rule
in the case of May Department Stores Co. 41 There it was provided that
an employer may lawfully interrogate his employees when it is a necessary part of his defense to unfair labor practice charges and when it is
strictly limited to the scope of the issues raised. 42 On a few occasions
the Board also made an exception to its per se rule for sporadic and
43
innocuous questioning.
33. Id. at 1360.
34. 98 N.L.R.B. 867 (1952).
35. Id. at 875.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 868.

38. Id. at 873.
39. Id. at 870.
40. Id. at 870 n.6.

41. 70 N.L.R.B. 94 (1946).
42. Id. at 95.
43. See, e.g., Waffle Corp. of America, 103 N.L.R.B. 895 (1953); Commercial
Printing Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 469 (1952); United States Gypsum Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 966
(1951).
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With the exception of three circuits, 44 judicial response to the Standard

rule was antagonistic. What seemed to bother the courts was the Board's
failure to consider the many variable factors in each case which might
influence a conclusion that the interrogation interfered with and coerced
the employees. The thrust of judicial discontent with the per se approach
revolved around 7 factors which were considered important in assessing
the effect of any employee interrogation. These factors included: (1)
the existence of an employer background of anti-union animus and/or
conduct ;45 (2) the attempt to use the information gathered from the
employees to subsequently interfere, restrain, or coerce them ;40 (3) the
fact that section 8(c) provides at least limited protection to the employer ;47
(4) the employer's first amendment right of free speech permits reasonable inquiries into the status of unionization ;48 (5) the existence of actual
threats or attempts at coercion ;49 (6) the existence of a general pattern
of interrogation;50 (7) whether the words were in and of themselves intimidating. 51 It would appear, from an examination of these indicia, that
the circuits were employing some form of a "totality of conduct" test to
determine whether the interrogation did in fact have a coercive effect
52
upon the employees.
44. The three circuits included the District of Columbia Circuit, the Third

Circuit and the Eighth Circuit. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Bochner v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1950); NLRB v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1950).

45. See NLRB v. England Bros., Inc., 201 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1953). In this
case the court said:
Since there is no finding of an illegal anti-union attitude or background on
the part of the respondent and since the trial examiner found that the conduct of
vice president England was free from any taint of unfair labor practice, the Board
cannot rely on an "aroma of coercion" as evidence upon which to base its finding
in this case.
Id. at 398.
46. See Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1953).
47. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951). The
court held in this case that a manager's inquiries about what was being done on behalf
of the union and his statements about his animus toward the union were not violative
of section 8(a) (1) to the extent that they did not constitute a threat or intimidation.
This, the court said, was particularly so since the enactment of section 8(c) of the
Taft-Hartley amendment. Id. at 163.
48. See Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948). The court, in denying
enforcement of a Board order based on a finding that the employer violated section
8(a) (1) when he randomly interrogated some of his employees as to their union
memberships and activities, stated:
Such perfunctory, innocuous remarks and queries, standing alone as they do
in this case, are insufficient to support a finding of a violation of Section 8(1).
They come instead within the protection of free speech protected by the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
49. See NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1952). In this case the
court said:
The evidence does not disclose any threat or attempt at coercion. The incident
was not part of any general pattern of interrogating employees generally about
union affiliation and activities. In our opinion, such limited interrogation, justified
by the acts of the employees themselves, was not a violation of the Act.
Id. at 44.
50. Id. See also Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1948).
51. Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1948).
52. This test was created by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 314 ',S. 469 (1941). The test was applied in that case to the
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B.

The BLUE FLASH EXPRESS Doctrine

The courts of appeals' dissatisfaction with the Standard doctrine
prompted the Board to reconsider its position, with a significant impetus
to change being the Second Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Syracuse Color
Press, Inc. 53 In that case, the employer's supervisors interrogated several
"key" employees about their union membership, the union membership
of some of their fellow employees, their attendance at union meetings, and
the location of such meetings.5 4 It was evident from the findings of the
field examiner that the employer favored one competing union over the
other and that the interrogation was for the purpose of interfering with
the activities of the unpreferred union.55 The court, in upholding the
Board's finding of an 8(a) (1) violation, said that the language of the
questions was not intimidating in and of itself and therefore the coercive
effect of the interrogation would have to be determined by an examination
of the record as a whole. 56 The court went on to enumerate those factors
that it considered determinative of the questions of whether or not an
interrogation has or is likely to have a coercive or restraining effect upon
the employees. These factors included: (1) timing of the interrogation;
(2) the place; (3) the personnel involved; (4) the nature of the informa57
tion sought; and (5) the employers conceded preference.
58
In Blue Flash Express, Inc., the Board finally responded to the
many signals for change and announced a new and much broader test for
determining whether employee interrogation is violative of the Act. This
test was "whether, under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Act."59 After expressly overruling the Standard
doctrine, the Board found that the employer's poll of his employees as to
whether they had signed union authorization cards was not violative of
the Act because; (1) the employer communicated the purpose of the questioning to his employees; (2) the purpose was to ascertain if the union
really did represent the majority they claimed; (3) he assured them they
would not receive any reprisals; and (4) the polling occurred against
a background free from employer hostility to unionization. ° Furthermore,
the Board expressly adopted the Second Circuit's Syracuse Color Press
tests for determining whether a particular interrogation does in fact interfere with, restrain or coerce the employees. As a further clarification of
this new doctrine, the Board also emphasized the fact that interrogation
employer's bulletin and speeches pertaining to his electioneering. The test is "[I]f
the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their free choice,
then those employees are entitled to the protection of the Act." Id. at 477.
53. 209 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1954).
54. Id. at 597.
55. Id. at 599.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
59. Id. at 593.

60. Id. at 593-94.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/5

8

Venzie: Employee Interrogation as Inherently Destructive Conduct: A New A

698

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15

is systematic, does not in and of itself impart a coercive character to it
and does not have to be accompanied by other unfair labor practices
before it can be violative of the Act. 61
In the interim period between the Blue Flash doctrine and the
Struksnes doctrine, the Board crystallized three of the determinative
facts in the Blue Flash case into operative standards by which it determined the legality of an interrogation. These standards included the
following inquiries: (1) was there a legitimate purpose for the questioning; (2) were the employees so informed of this purpose; and (3)
were there assurances against reprisals. 62 The Board's strict application
of these standards in numerous cases constituted a movement away from
the more broad and flexible totality of the circumstances test that it had
originally announced. 63 Perhaps this apparent inconsistency can be rationalized by assuming that the Board in exercising its expertise found that
when these three factors were not present the employees were most likely
to be intimidated.
Comparing the Blue Flash doctrine with those factors announced by
the circuits in response to the Standard rule, one might reasonably conclude that the Board had achieved a judicially acceptable approach.
However, this proved not to be the case. In a series of five major cases,
four circuit courts of appeals - the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth adversely responded to this doctrine. As a result of this discontent, the
courts evolved their own body of standards which they considered to be
determinative of the legality of an interrogation.
The Ninth Circuit expressed its discontent with the Blue Flash
doctrine in S.H. Kress & Co. v. NLRB. 64 In this case, the Board found
that the employer had violated section 8(a) (1) in polling his employees
for the purpose of ascertaining how many of them had signed union cards,
after the union had petitioned the Board for an election.6 5 The Board's
rationale was that an employer poll under these circumstances has no
legitimate purpose and is, in effect, a usurpation of the Board's function.6"
The court's response to this argument was threefold. First, it held that
the Board's legitimate purpose requirement is not determinative of the
coercive character of an interrogation. 67 Secondly, the test in every case
is "whether the purpose . . . [of the interrogation] would appear to
the employees to constitute reasonable grounds for an interrogation."6 8
61. Id. at 593.
62. See Bok, supra note 2, at 107.

63. See, e.g., Cohen Bros. Fruit Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 65 L.R.R.M. 1486

(June 28, 1967) ;Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964) ; Orkin Exterminating Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 399 (1962) ; Frank Sullivan & Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 726 (1961);
Burke Golf Equip. Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 241 (1960).
64. 317 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963).
65. Id. at 226-28.
66. Id. at 228.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Thirdly, if the purpose of the interrogation appears legitimate to the
employees, then the fact that it occurred "would carry no sinister implication to the employees." 69
The Seventh Circuit similarly responded in NLRB v. Larry Paul
Oldsmobile Co. 70 by refusing to enforce a Board order based on a finding
that the employer had unlawfully interrogated his salesman when he asked
several of them if they had signed union authorization cards, even though
the union had demanded recognition and requested that bargaining begin. 7'
The Paul court held that the employer's failure to assure his employees
of no reprisals was not determinative of the legality of the poll, 72 but was
only one circumstance which was not to be considered to the exclusion
73
of all others.
About a year later, the Second Circuit voiced its dissatisfaction with
the Blue Flash doctrine in Bourne v. NLRB. 74 There the court refused
to enforce that portion of the Board's order based on the finding of an
8(a) (1) violation because the employer interrogated some of his employees as to their union activities. The court held that "interrogation
not itself threatening, is not held to be an unfair labor practice unless it
meets fairly severe standards. ' 75 It then listed five standards which must
be considered before there can be a proper finding of "interference or
coercion." These include:
(1) The background, i.e., is there a history of employer hostility and
discrimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., did the interrogator
appear to be seeking information on which to base taking action
against individual employees?
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e., how high was he in the company hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g., was employee called from
work to the boss's office? Was there an atmosphere of "unnatural formality" ?
(5) Truthfulness of the reply. 76
Nine months later, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Camco, Inc., 77
registered its discontent with Blue Flash by enumerating several factors
that it felt were determinative of whether or not an employee interrogation was intimidating or coercive. The court said that the answer to the
question of what effect an interrogation has on the employees must be
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
Id.
332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964).
Id. at 48.
Id.
340 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1965).
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found in an examination of the context in which the questions were
asked. 78 Those factors which the court considered relevant to defining
this context included: (1) the employer's stated position on unionization of his employees; (2) the nexus between the interrogatees and their
union activities; (3) the close connection between the interrogations
and subsequent terminations of employment; (4) the systematic and
intensive nature of the interrogations; and (5) the truthfulness of employee responses. 79 After evaluating all these considerations and giving
due recognition to the Board's finding that the employer had violated
two of its standards by not explaining the purpose of the interrogations
to the employees and not giving them assurances against reprisals, the
court concluded that the employer had violated 8(a)(1).80
The last major case to discredit the Blue Flash doctrine was NLRB
v. Lorben Corporation."' In this case the Second Circuit again refused
to enforce a Board order based on unlawful employee interrogation. The
Board supported its finding of an 8(a) (1) violation on the ground that
the employer had not complied with its enumerated standards for a lawful
poll. 82 It found that because the employer failed to communicate the purpose of the poll to his employees and did not assure them against reprisals,
the poll was an unlawful interference prohibited by 8(a) (1).83 The
court held that the problem of delineating what is "coercion by interrogation" has resisted any set rules or specific limitations and in light
of the surrounding circumstances of this case the absence of these two
84
factors failed to show coercion.
The judicial response to the Board's Blue Flash doctrine in one
respect parallels the judicial response to its Standard-Coosa-Thatcher
doctrine. Both responses seem to point up the efforts of the judiciary
to achieve, as close as possible, a "perfect" answer in each case and their
reluctance to accept anything less than adequate recognition of all the
variables that might affect the outcome in any given case.85 The new
standards formulated by the circuits seem to accentuate the apparent
inconsistency in the Board's approach to the varying circumstances in
each case. Thus, the need for clarification of standards and consistency
among the Board and the courts became ever more current.
C.

The STRUKSNES Doctrine

In 1964, the Board decided the Struksnes Constr. Co.8s case in which
the primary question was whether an employer poll of his employees for
78. Id. at 807.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965).

82. Id. at 347.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 348.
85. Lesnick, The Labor Board and The Courts of Appeals: A Crisis of Confidence, N.Y.U. 21 ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 35, 40 (1969).
86. 148University
N.L.R.B.Charles
1368 (1964).
Published by Villanova
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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the purpose of ascertaining the majority status of a union seeking recognition constituted an 8(a) (1) violation. The polling procedure utilized
by the employer consisted of each employee signing a paper and indicats7
ing by a "yes or no" whether he wished to be represented by the unionY
The Board, applying its Blue Flash standards, found the poll to be lawful
because it was for a legitimate purpose, there was no anti-union animus,
and there were assurances against reprisals.8 8 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case to the Board
for reconsideration because of apparent inconsistency with some of the
Board's prior applications of Blue Flash.8 9 The particular inconsistency
which was troubling the court was the finding that the poll conformed
to Blue Flash standards despite the fact that the employer had failed to
communicate its purpose to the employees and despite the fact that he
had a permanent record of the votes which could be used for subsequent
discrimination.9" In its remand, the court pointed out that the Blue
Flash doctrine, as applied in this case, did not adequately protect the
employees' section 7 rights. It suggested that what was needed were
minimum well defined standards which could be more readily understood and applied. 91
In 1967, after the Board reconsidered its prior position on employer
polling, it announced what has come to be known as the Struksnes doctrine. This states that:
absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be violative of section 8(a) (1) unless the following
safeguards are observed: (1) The purpose of the poll is to determine
the truth of a unions claim of majority; (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees; (3) assurances against reprisals are
given; (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot and; (5) the
87. Id. at 1370.
88. Id. at 1371.
89. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'r, Local No. 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
90. Id. at 855. The court was particularly troubled by the apparent inconsistency
of its finding in Struksnes with Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), and
The Lorben Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964). In Johnnie's Poultry, the Board stated
that there are only two reasons why an employer may interrogate his employees:
verification of union's claim of majority status or investigation of facts concerning
issues raised in a complaint in which employer must prepare a defense. The Board
stated further that there were specific safeguards which must be followed to minimize
the coercive effect of the interrogation. These included: (1) communicating to the
employee the purpose of the questioning; (2) assure him that no reprisals will take
place; (3) obtain participation on a voluntary basis; (4) questioning must occur in
a context free of employer hostility to the union and must not be itself coercive in
nature; and (5) the questions must not exceed the necessities of the legitimate
purpose. 146 N.L.R.B. at 775. In Lorben Corp., the Board upheld the trial examiners
findings that the employer violated 8(a) (1) because: (1) there was no legitimate
purpose for the poll since the union had not yet sought recognition; (2) respondent
did not explain the purpose of the poll to all employees; and (3) he did not offer or
provide any assurances to the employees that their rights under the Act would not be
infringed. 146 N.L.R.B. at 1511-12.
91. 353 F.2d at 856.
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employer has not engaged in9 2unfair labor practices or otherwise
created a coercive atmosphere.
The Board also expressed the further limitation that any poll taken while
a petition for a Board election is pending is unlawful.98
Up to the time of the writing of this Comment, the Struksnes doctrine has been reviewed only by the Eighth Circuit. In NLRB v. Harry
F. Berggren & Sons, Inc.,9 4 the court strictly applied the Struksnes
safeguards, holding that even though the employer had complied with
four of the five safeguards, his failure to comply with the requirement
that he give his employees assurances against reprisals justified the
Board's finding of an 8(a) (1) violation. 95 However, the Berggren court
carefully pointed out in a footnote to its opinion that its holding was
being confined to a systematic polling situation and was therefore distinguishable from the three isolated instances of informed questioning in
the Paul case. 6 The dissent rejected the majority's strict application of
Struksnes and argued that the requirement of assurance against reprisals
97
was not necessary when the "totality of the circumstances" are examined.
It was suggested that a requirement that the employer actually utter
98
the words is meaningless if there exists an atmosphere of coercion.
Although the Struksnes doctrine may appear to be a more satisfactory
approach to the problem of employee interrogation than its predecessors,
two fundamental questions concerning it remain unanswered. First, how
does this rule affect the prior law on employee interrogation, and secondly,
how does it line up with the criteria previously announced by the circuits?
The answer to the first question must begin with a determination of the
meaning and scope of this doctrine. Strictly construed, Struksnes would
seem to apply only to polling or the formal balloting of employee union
sentiments.99 If that is the case, then it would seem that this doctrine
would not be applicable to other forms of interrogation such as questioning
that concerns the status of a union organizational campaign. Carrying
this reasoning one step further, it could be said that if Struksnes is only
applicable to polling, then the Blue Flash doctrine must still be controlling
as to other forms of interrogation. 00 This proposition seems particularly
strong in light of the fact that the Board held Struksnes to be a revision
92. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (June

26, 1967).

93. Id. at 1387.
94. 406 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1969).

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245 n.9.
Id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.

99. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1387 (June

26, 1967).

100. This argument is strengthened by the Board's reference in Struksnes to a
revision of the Blue Flash doctrine. This can be interpreted to mean that those
aspects of Blue Flash that applied to polling were revised by Struksnes while the
doctrine remains controlling over other forms of interrogation such as questioning.
65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (June 26, 1967).
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of the Blue Flash doctrine, which was applied to all forms of employee
interrogation. Inherently, this uncertainty rests with the failure of both
the Board and the courts to properly define the distinction between polling
and other forms of interrogation.
An immediate response to the second inquiry of how does Struksnes
line up with those standards previously announced by the circuits would
be that it is inconsistent. The circuit courts' considerations would seem
to preclude any form of rigid approach to both the polling and questioning aspects of interrogation. More specifically, the Second Circuit
in Bourne and Lorben emphasized that many circumstantial factors determine whether an interrogation has a coercive effect on the employees and
the absence or presence of any one of them is inconclusive. The five
considerations announced by the Fifth Circuit in Camco underline its
emphasis upon the context of the questioning as being the critical factor.
Struksnes, however, makes no recognition of these considerations, unless
its "coercive atmosphere" element can be construed to include them. The
"legitimate purpose" test announced by the Ninth Circuit in Kress
directly conflicts with the sole purpose approach in Struksnes. The Kress
test declared that the question to be asked in every interrogation case
is "whether the purpose would appear to the employees to constitute
reasonable grounds for an interrogation," 10' while Struksnes on the other
hand, declares that the only legitimate purpose for polling employees is
to "determine the truth of a unions claim of majority. 1 0 2 The Eighth
Circuit's strict requirement in Berggren that all of the Struksnes safeguards must be complied with, coupled with a similar attitude by the
Board, is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Faul.10 The
court said in Faul that the employer's failure to assure his employees
against reprisals is only one of the many factors to be considered, but
"not to the exclusion of all others." Just how the Struksnes doctrine
will be received by the circuits, particularly those most dissatisfied with
the Board's doctrinal approaches in the past, is still an open question.
But what does seem likely is that litigation over the legality of employee
interrogation will remain trapped in the Blue Flash "thicket" of uncertainty and confusion.'

04

The conflicts and inconsistencies that emerge from the foregoing historical and prospective analysis suggest a need for a new perspective of
the entire problem of employee interrogation. It is submitted that this
new perspective may be best obtained by turning to a foundational analysis
conducted on two levels: The first concerning the definition and balancing
101. 317 F.2d at 228.
102. 65 L.R.R.M. at 1386.

103. NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 1963).

The Board's strict application of its Struksnes rule by requiring that all of the safeguards be complied with parallels the Eighth Circuit's application in Berggren. See,
e.g., Wallace Co., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 70 L.R.R.M. 1235 (Feb. 12, 1969); Alco
Mining Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 67 L.R.R.M. 1345 (Jan. 30, 1968).
104. The term "Blue Flash thicket" was used by Judge Wisdom in his majority
opinion in Camco. 340 F.2d at 804. Sce also id. at 804 n.6.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/5
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of the individual employer and employee interest that are related to employee interrogation and the second involving a recognition of the policy
considerations underlying the National Labor Relations Act.
III.

BALANCING THE INTERESTS -

THE FOUNDATION

FOR A NEW APPROACH

The balancing of interests test is well recognized as a fundamental
juristic approach to understanding the legal foundations of a society.' 0 5
Social order demands that a legal system identify, value, balance, and
then secure various human interests. 10 6 This four step process for determining those competing interests which should receive legal recognition
pervades the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes. An example of the application of this test may be seen by looking to the
National Labor Relations Act itself. Section 7 grants to those employees
within its jurisdiction the substantive right of self-organization and engagement in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Section 8(c), on the other hand, recognizes the employers right to express
his views, arguments, or opinions on the issue of unionization so long as
his expressions contain no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
Through this legislative mandate Congress has given recognition and value
to these interests. When they come into conflict, as for example when an
employer has launched an intensive anti-union campaign in an effort to
ward off employee organization, the Board and possibly even the courts
will be called upon to balance and ultimately secure these interests. 10 7
This approach would seem to be an appropriate principle upon which to
evaluate the interests which come into conflict during an employee interrogation. The results from the application of this balancing test should
reveal those interests which warrant legal recognition. The nature of
these interests will then determine the form which this legal recognition
should take. Subsections A and B will identify those interests that come
into conflict during an interrogation and subsection C will attempt value
and balance these interests.
A.

Employer Interests

Traditionally the employer's interests in interrogating his employees
about their union sentiments or activities have fallen into four general
categories. One category includes his interests in fulfilling those legal
obligations imposed upon him because of his status as one of the parties
105. See 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDgNcI 16, 22 (1959).
106. Id. at 22.
107. For an example of the judicial balancing of the interests recognized by sections
7 and 8(c), see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). For examples
of Board balancing of these interests, see, e.g., Freeman Mfg. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 577
(1964) ; Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962) ; Silver Knit Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 422 (1952).
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in an industrial relationship which is regulated by law. 08 These duties
include, for example, his 8(a) (5) duty to bargain and his duty to prepare
a defense against a Regional Director's complaint alleging unfair labor
practices. A second category includes those legitimate business interests
which might require an interrogation. An example of this kind of interest
which the Board has recognized is an employer's need to know if a
majority of his employees will desire a union in the near future so he may
accurately compute his business costs in preparation of a public bid to be
submitted before unionization has reached the recognition stage. 10 9 A
third category would include his personal interests in satisfying a genuine
curiosity about the nature and scope of an unknown force among his
employees and how it will affect the status quo. An example of this type
of interest is dissension among the work force. 110 The final category of
employer interests would include his need to know the scope and intensity
of union activity so that he may formulate a campaign strategy to adequately express his views and opinions on the issues of unionization. This
interest is exemplified in the situation where the employer anonymously
learns of union organizational activity and subsequently interrogates some
of his employees about it and learning from them that the union has been
having difficulty recruiting members, and then decides to sit back and
leave well enough alone."'
B. Employee Interests
Ultimately, the employee interests related to the problem of employee
interrogation originate from his need and desire to participate in an
industrial form of government. Generally speaking, his desire for selforganization is a manifestation of more fundamental interests - economic,
social, and industrial-political in nature." 2 Economically, his orientation
is toward income stability and job security. Socially, his interests are to
participate in group life and share a community of interests with others.
His industrial-political interests stem from his need to participate in the
exercise of power and control over his life in an industrial society. However, within the specific context of employee interrogation, his basic interest is to remain free in the exercise of his section 7 rights to selforganization. This interest is divisible into the more specific interests of
108. For an exhaustive analysis of an employer's duty to bargain and the scope

of that duty, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THs LGAL PROC4SS 52-90 (1968).
See also May Department Stores Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 94 (1946).
109. See NLRB v. Kingston, 172 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1949). See also 63 HARV. L.
Rzv. 900-01 (1950).

110. See Anderson Air Activities, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 698 (1960).

This case in-

volved mild interrogation to determine the source and scope of dissention among a
work crew.
111. The employer's argument here is that he has a legitimate need to know the
intensity of unionization so he may fully exercise his 8(c) rights by developing an

adequate campaign strategy. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
112. H. WXLLINGTON, supra note 108, at 27.
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participation in union organizational campaigns without fear of subsequent employer discrimination, union memberships, and the sharing of the
rewards of the collective bargaining process.
C.

The Valuation and Balance

The valuation of those employer and employee interests identified
above will pivot around four factors. They include the situs of power in
the pre-union employment relationship, the potential for abuse of that
power, the situs of injury when competing interests come into conflict, and
the availability of reasonable alternatives for effectuating those interests.
Both the employer and employee interests will be considered in light of
the above mentioned factors to determine which of them should receive
legal recognition and security."" These four valuation factors have been
selected because they are indicia of two fundamental elements in every
relationship - power and injury. These two elements become determinative of which group of interests should receive legal recognition when
those interests become antagonistic and the relationship is one of necessity
as in the case of the employment relationship.
The first factor - the situs of power - concerns the identification
of the party which has the right to define and control the nature and
form of the employer-employee relationship. Under the terms of the
normal pre-union employment contract, there is little question as to the
location of the situs of power. It is situated with the employer. He sets
the terms and conditions of employment, notwithstanding any minimal
bargaining that might occur because of some strategic position which
the employee has managed to obtain.
The second factor, being directly related to the first, also rests with
the employer. Since the power to regulate the pre-union employment
relationship rests with the employer, he then is the potential source of
abuse of that power. This is not to say that inevitably all employers will
abuse their power over an employee, but only that considerations of motive
and intent run in his direction. It can be argued that the employee does retain some power to affect his employment relationships and that this power
is subject to abuse also. Such a consideration would probably include employee disregard of certain employment terms such as the hours of work or
level of expected production. However, it is suggested that this power is
negligible and does not begin to create a balance in the relationship.
The question of the situs and the extent of injury that is experienced
by either group of antagonistic interests as a result of their conflict
relates directly to the social value assigned to these interests. If one particular group of interests is deemed to be of a higher societal value than
the other, then those interests of higher value will be the principal subject
113. The employee interest in being able to freely exercise his section 7 rights is
not without protection at the present time. Section 8(a) unfair labor practices and
the Board's regulation of pre-election conduct provide him with some protection.
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of legal recognition and security.11 4 The situs of the injury resulting from
an employee interrogation is situated with the employee. The source of
this injury flows from the interference or coercive effect that the employer's questioning or poll will have upon the employee. In most cases,
the actual restraint upon the employee's free exercise of his section 7
rights will result from a fear of employer retribution and discrimination." 5
The magnitude of this fear may be more fully understood by looking to
the realities of the employment relationship. The Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co." 6 emphasized the nature of this fear when it said:
[A]n employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and
protected by 8(a) (1). .

.

. And any balancing of those rights must

take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their
employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that
relationship, to pick-up intended implications of the latter7 that might
be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear."
The magnitude of this fear will, of course, vary with the degree of economic
dependence, but the risks of injury to his interests are considerable. The
extent of this injury will depend upon the degree of restraint upon his
efforts to effectuate those interests. The fact that the situs of injury is
situated with the employee does not mean that the employer's interests
will not be injured. If the interrogation of his employees to obtain information for a legitimate purpose is absolutely prohibited and there are
no available alternatives for acquiring this needed information, then his
interests have been effectively restrained. However, under the present
state of the law this is not the case and, consequently, the injury runs in
the direction of the employee.
The final valuation factor to be considered is the availability of reasonable alternative channels of interests realization. This factor is designed
to reveal which of the groups of antagonistic interests could utilize alternative channels of realization to mitigate the dimensions of the conflict. An
example of this concept is the alternative cause of action available to the
employer for the realization of his legal interests in fulfilling his duty to
bargain when he is confronted with a union demand for recognition. Under
the Board's current practice as announced in Aaron Brothers,"8 considerations of employer good faith are no longer relevant in determining whether
he has failed to fulfill his 8(a) (5) duty to bargain. 119 In the past, when
an employer entertained a good faith doubt as to the validity of a union's
114. See 3 R. POUND, supra note 105, at 22. See also C. MoRRis, THE GREAT
LEGAL PHILosoPEnRs 536-37 (1959).

115. For a good overview of employee fear as a necessary consequence of an
interrogation and its effect upon the employee's section 7 rights, see the dissenting
opinion of Board members Murdock and Peterson in Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109
N.L.R.B. at 595-600.
116. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
117. Id. at 617.
118. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
119. Id. at 1078-79.
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claim of majority status, he would have to interrogate his employees on
this point, using the results of the interrogation as affirmative reasons for
his refusal to bargain. 120 But now the employer has two alternative courses
of action available to him in which he can satisfy his doubts of the union's
claim without risking the issuance of a bargaining order.' 2 ' He can insist
that the union go to an election, regardless of his motive, so long as he
does not commit any serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the
election processes, or he can poll his employees in strict accordance with
the safeguards enumerated in Struksnes.. 22 In either case, the interests
of both parties are protected and the conflict is avoided.
The application of the reasonable alternative factor to both the employer's and the employee's interests reveals that the availability of alternative courses of action is situated with the employer. It is conceded that
some of the employer's interests will probably not find alternative realization, such as his need to know the status of unionization for the purpose
of designing his campaign strategy. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of his interest can be alternatively realized. The
employee's interests, on the other hand, have no alternative channels of
realization since the only way that a conflict with employer interests could
be avoided is if the employer knew nothing about the unionization of his
plant until the union was certified. If this were possible, the interrogation
problem would be non-existent because by definition it involves preelection conduct.
It is submitted that on the basis of the foregoing valuation, the balance
runs in the direction of the employee.' 28 This conclusion seems totally
consistent with the policies behind the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 7 reflects congressional recognition of the employee's interests in
120. For a good analysis of the employer's Hobson's choice argument, see NLRB
v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1960).
121. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 609 (1969). Section 10 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), empowers the Board "to
prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor practices" enumerated in section 8.
Under section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), the Board is empowered to issue
cease and desist orders from unfair labor practices and to take affirmative action
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board derives its power to issue
bargaining orders from this latter section. A bargaining order compels the employer
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the certified union. It is a strong
remedy which the Board employs when it feels that it is necessary to compensate for
unlawful practices of the employer.
122. 395 U.S. at 609.
123. A different type of analysis, put forth in legal process terms, which has been
offered as a justification for active legal protection of the employee's rights to organize
and bargain collectively, states: (1) it is desirable to have an industrial democracy
to prevent the dehumanization of the worker and this requires a union democracy;
(2) interests groups are a favorable institution in the life of a democracy because it
is a source of individual interest realization and maintains a diffusion of political
power; (3) the establishment and maintenance of the collective bargaining institution
will substantially reduce the economic strife created by industrialization because it
offers negotiations over class conflict; (4) it is necessary because of inequality of bargaining power between the employer and the unorganized employee. H. WELLINGTON,
supra note 108, at 26-27.
It has also been suggested that the problem of employee interrogation could
be best analyzed by a prima facie tort approach. Cox, Some Current Problems in
Labor Law:
An Apprisal,
35 L.R.R.M.
(1954).
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balancing the power in the industrial community. The Act created and is
designed to protect the fundamental right of every employee through an
elected representative to bargain on an equal basis with his employer as
to the terms and conditions of his employment. Therefore, if this right
is to be realized, the embryonic stages of unionization must be insulated
from employer interference.
IV.

Great Dane and Struksnes -

THE BASIS

FOR A

NEW

PRESUMPTIVE RULE

In the preceding section it was pointed out that the inherent problem
with an employer's interrogation of his employees as to their union
sympathies and activities is the difficulty of determining its real effect
upon the employee's free exercise of his right of self-organization. This
is the problem that created the milieu of standards advocated by the courts
of appeals. Those standards represented judicial efforts to determine in
every case whether the employees were in fact restrained or coerced by
the interrogation. But it is submitted that the impossibility of determining
when such a subjective element as fear has actually been evoked plus the
high degree of risk of injury to vital employee interests leads to the
reasonable conclusion that this form of employer conduct is inherently
dangerous to the employee's rights and must be severely proscribed. 2 4
This is not to say that it should be absolutely prohibited, because there
are some legitimate employer interests at stake. However, it is submitted
that in any scheme designed to regulate employee interrogation, the thrust
of legal protection must be in the direction of the employee's interests.
A. "Inherently Destructive Conduct"
It is submitted that a new approach to this problem may be formulated by the merging of two already existing labor law doctrines. The
first is the "inherently destructive conduct" doctrine enunciated by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.12 5 Although the
issue in that case was employer discrimination in violation of 8(a) (3),
the Court's doctrinal approach seems similarly applicable to employee
interrogations. The rationale behind the "inherently destructive" concept
is that some employer conduct by its very nature is destructive of the
employee's interests and because of this it is proscribed without any consideration of employer motive. 12 A form of conduct is deemed to be
124. The following quote from K. DAVIS, HUMAN RELATIONS AT WORK: THt
DYNAMICS OP ORGANIZATIONAL BEIAVIOR 340 (3d ed. 1967), points up the inherent
misunderstandings in communications between manager and worker when the purpose
of the interrogation is not understood and inferences are thus drawn:
The meaning which a worker gets from a manager's communication depends
upon the confidence he has in the communicator's purpose. The worker searches
between the lines, wondering, "why did he say that?' .... What was his purpose?"

It is suggested that an employee participating in underground organizational efforts
has little confidence that the employer's questioning is in good faith.

125. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/5
126. Id. at 33.
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"inherently destructive" because it necessarily produces "unavoidable consequences.' 127 If the employer conduct in question falls within this category, then he has the burden of justifying his actions as being something
other than they appear on their face. 128

It is submitted that employee

interrogation could be categorized as employer conduct which is "inherently
destructive." That being the case, once the fact of interrogation is shown,
an 8 (a) (1) unfair labor practice would be presumed and the burden would
then fall upon the employer to show some legitimate purpose for his actions.
B.

"Legitimate Purpose" as a Defense

To protect those employer interests which cannot find alternative
channels of realization, an affirmative defense to the "inherently destructive"
rule is necessary. It is submitted that the Struksnes doctrine will provide
a good foundation upon which to develop this defense and will provide
the employer with a reliable standard for meeting his burden of proof.
It is further suggested that the Struksnes rule be expanded to permit
employee interrogation for any "legitimate employer purpose," including
those Part III interests enumerated in Part 11,129 while basically retaining
the other safeguards as they are. Employing the Struksnes rule in modified
form as a permissible method of interrogation will provide the employer
with a last resort for obtaining needed information when he has exhausted
all his reasonable alternative methods of inquiry, and, at the same time,
afford the employee with adequate insulation from employer interference.
C. A New Presumptive Rule
The merger of these two doctrines as modified above can serve as a
new rule for determining whether employee interrogation constitutes an
8(a) (1) violation. The new presumptive rule' 30 is stated as follows:
An employer's interrogation of his employees concerning their union
sympathies, activities, or other related union matters, or those of their
fellow employees is presumed to be "inherently destructive" conduct
and will result in an 8(a) (1) violation unless the employer has
strictly complied with all of the following safeguards:
(a.) It is for a legitimate purpose;
(b.) A legitimate purpose exists when (1) the employer has no
reasonable alternative means of acquiring this information
and (2) a substantial and legitimate employer end is served;
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. See pp. 704-05 supra.

130. A presumptive rule, as the Board uses that term, is a rule that creates a
rebuttable presumption. For examples of other Board "presumptive rules" which have
been upheld, see NLRB v. United Steelworkers and Nutone, Inc., 357 U.S. 357 (1958) ;
NLRB University
v. Babcock
& Wilcox
351of U.S.
105 (1956);
Republic
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(c.) The purpose for the interrogation is communicated to the
employee;
(d.) The employee is given adequate express assurance against
any reprisals;
(e.)

If the interrogation is in the form of an employee poll it must
be by secret ballot. If the interrogation is in the form of
questioning the employer must (1) inform the employee
that he does not have to participate in the interrogation if he
does not wish to do so and (2) that if he does desire to participate, he may still refuse to answer any specific question;

(f.)

The employer has not otherwise engaged in unfair labor
practices or created a "coercive atmosphere."

Under this rule employee interrogation would be deemed to be a prima
facie violation of section 8(a) (1). The burden is placed upon the employer to prove to the Board that his interrogation strictly complied with
all the enumerated safeguards and if he fails to do so, he will be faced
with Board remedial action. 18 1
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately the Board and the courts will have to find some common
ground for agreement as to what will be the proper approach to the
problem of employee interrogation. It is a fair guess that the Board's
present approach under Struksnes is doomed to the same ill fate in the
circuits as its predecessor, Blue Flash. There is merit, however, in the
current rule as far as it extends to polling. Perhaps the Board intended
it to be applied to all forms of employee interrogation, but this seems
doubtful.8 2 Nevertheless, any new solutions that the Board might entertain should adequately consider the inherent danger of employee interrogation to the employee's fundamental rights of self-organization and
participation in concerted activities and the almost insurmountable difficutly of ascertaining its actual effect upon these rights.
Howard D. Venzie, Jr.

131. See note 130 supra.
132. See note 100 supra.
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